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FAQ: Everything we know so far about Apple's battle with the FBI

Susie Ochs | Feb. 23, 2016
This is a complicated case that could stretch on for months, but we'll keep this updated as more news breaks.

But if it was his employer’s phone, can’t they access its data, or at least consent to the search?

The San Bernardino County Department of Health did consent to the search, but the iPhone is locked with a passcode (reportedly a 4-digit pin, not something more complex), and apparently the county didn’t use good multi-device management practices, because they don’t know that passcode and couldn’t access anything on the phone without it. From the same February 19 court filing:

The FBI obtained a warrant to search the iPhone, and the owner of the iPhone, Farook’s employer, also gave the FBI its consent to the search. Because the iPhone was locked, the government subsequently sought Apple’s help in its efforts to execute the lawfully issued search warrant. Apple refused.

Why is Apple refusing to unlock the phone?

That wasn’t what Apple was asked to do—Apple actually has no way of unlocking a locked iPhone. Apple does have a way to extract data from a device running iOS 7 or earlier, without having to unlock the phone. Apple has done this before for law enforcement with a proper court order—another filing by the government estimates at least 70 times.

But starting with iOS 8, the data on an iPhone is encrypted by default as soon as you enable the passcode feature. Since Farook’s iPhone 5c is running iOS 9, the only way to access the encrypted data it holds is to unlock the phone with the passcode. Since the owner of the phone (Farook’s employer) doesn’t know the passcode, and Apple doesn’t know the passcode, and Farook is dead, the FBI is stuck trying to crack the passcode through brute force.

What does the FBI want Apple to do to help brute-force the passcode?

The best defense iOS has against a brute-force attack is the Erase Data feature, which will wipe all the data on the iPhone after 10 failed passcode attempts. The iPhone has a 4-digit pin, which shouldn’t take too long to crack, but certainly more than 10 tries.

So the FBI’s request, and the court’s February 16 order, is for Apple to create a sideloadable SIF (software image file) of iOS that can run on the iPhone’s RAM without touching any other data on the device. The FBI wants Apple to sign that software so the iPhone—and only this iPhone—will run it. Once installed, the software would disable that Erase Data setting.

The FBI also wants to try passcodes as quickly as possible, so it wants Apple to disable the delay between passcode attempts, plus allow passcodes to be inputted by a computer, either through the iPhone’s Lightning port or wirelessly, a feature that has never existed in a publicly shipping version of iOS. That’s a big deal—as Matthew Panzarino points out at TechCrunch, it’s asking Apple to introduce a new weakness into iOS.

 

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