Subscribe / Unsubscribe Enewsletters | Login | Register

Pencil Banner

Agency destroys $170K worth of IT gear over non-existent malware threat

Jaikumar Vijayan | July 11, 2013
Another $3 million worth of equipment at the Economic Development Administration would have met same fate but for lack of funds.

Rather than follow-up with the EDA to see what was going on, incident handlers at the Commerce Department wrongly assumed that the EDA had done an independent analysis of its systems and had identified many more systems that had been compromised.

"Unfortunately, both organizations continued to propagate the inaccurate information ... during the incident response activities," the IG's report noted.

In January 2012, EDA's CIO, Chuck Benjamin, decided to isolate the bureau's systems from the network on the mistaken belief that the infection was rampant and could spread to other networks. The CIO's decision to disconnect the system from the network also stemmed from, what turned out to be unfounded, fears that nation-state actors were behind the network infections.

A timeline of events provided in the IG's report does not indicate when exactly the EDA began destroying its IT systems in its effort to contain the imagined network infection. It does note however that Benjamin "concluded that the risk, or potential risk, of extremely persistent malware and nation-state activity [which did not exist] was great enough to necessitate the physical destruction of all of EDA's IT components," the report said.

"By August 1, 2012, EDA had exhausted funds for this effort and therefore halted the destruction of its remaining IT components, valued at over $3 million," the IG said.

The report slammed Benjamin and incident responders at both the Department of Commerce and the EDA for the snafu. It faulted the Commerce Department's incident response team for sending the initial incorrect notification, not properly documenting its communications, putting an inexperienced incident responder in charge of communicating with the EDA and then for not coordinating a proper response with the bureau.

The IG blamed Benjamin for not putting enough effort to properly validate the scope and seriousness of the reported infection before embarking on a needless and costly recovery effort. Even after an external security contractor hired by the EDA had identified only minor, easily remediated malware infections on the bureau's systems, Benjamin proceeded with his drastic recovery measures.

"In the end, nothing identified on EDA's components posed a significant risk to EDA's operations," the report noted. "Despite only finding common malware infections, EDA's management and CIO remained convinced that there could be extremely persistent malware somewhere in EDA's IT systems."

In total, the EDA spent $2.7 million -- or half its FY 2012 IT budget -- responding to the non-existent threat to its network. Despite fairly straightforward recovery recommendations from the National Security Agency and the DHS, the EDA focused on building out a new and improved IT infrastructure instead.

After disconnecting its systems last January, the EDA signed up for a shared service from the U.S. Census Bureau to maintain a Web presence and for email services. Last March, the bureau issued new laptops to all users and April set-up a standalone implementation of its core business applications.


Previous Page  1  2  3  Next Page 

Sign up for CIO Asia eNewsletters.